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Abstract
We provide new evidence on how monetary policy affects investment and fi rm fi nance in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Younger fi rms paying no dividends exhibit the largest 
and most signifcant change in capital expenditure – even after conditioning on size, asset 
growth, Tobin’s Q, leverage or liquidity – and drive the response of aggregate investment. 
Older companies, in contrast, hardly react at all. After a monetary policy tightening, net 
worth falls considerably for all fi rms but borrowing declines only for younger non-dividend 
payers, as their external fi nance is mostly exposed to asset value fl uctuations. Conversely, 
cash-fl ows change less markedly and more homogeneously across groups. Our fi ndings 
highlight the role of fi rm fi nance and fi nancial frictions in amplifying the effects of monetary 
policy on investment.
Keywords: monetary policy, fi nancial frictions, fi rm fi nance, investment.
JEL classifi cation: E22, E32, E52.
Resumen
En este trabajo se presenta nueva evidencia acerca del efecto que la política monetaria tiene 
sobre la inversión y la fi nanciación de las empresas en Estados Unidos y en el Reino Unido. 
Las empresas más jóvenes y que no pagan dividendos son las que muestran la mayor, 
—y estadísticamente signifi cativa—, reacción en términos de inversión en capital fi jo, mientras 
que las empresas relativamente antiguas casi no presentan reacción alguna. Esto es así 
aun controlando por características tradicionales en esta literatura, como son el tamaño, 
el crecimiento en activos, la valuación, el apalancamiento y liquidez. La reacción de empresas 
jóvenes que no pagan dividendos explica el movimiento de la inversión agregada. Después 
de una contracción en la política monetaria, se observa una reacción de la valuación de todas 
las empresas, mientras que la deuda responde solo para aquellas empresas jóvenes que no 
pagan dividendos. Esto se debe a que estas últimas son las más expuestas a cambios en 
el valor del colateral a la hora de endeudarse. Por otro lado, se observa también una reacción 
en los fl ujos de caja, aunque dicha reacción es relativamente pequeña y homogénea entre 
empresas. Estos resultados resaltan la importancia de la estructura fi nanciera, así como de 
las fricciones en la fi nanciación externa de las empresas, en la amplifi cación de los efectos 
de la política monetaria sobre la inversión empresarial.
Palabras clave: política monetaria, fricciones fi nancieras, fi nanciación empresarial, inversión.
Códigos JEL: E22, E32, E52.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of research about how monetary policy works. Motivated
by the role of credit and housing in the Great Recession, much of this work has focused on house-
holds. But, financial frictions also play a central role in popular narratives around the dramatic
fall in business investment during 2007-08. An equally pertinent question is, therefore, how interest
rates affect firms and whether financial constraints and firm finance play an important role in how
monetary policy affects investment.
A large empirical literature has provided clear evidence that aggregate investment and credit
conditions are very sensitive to changes in monetary policy. On the theoretical side, capital forma-
tion and financial frictions play a key role in the transmission mechanism of a number of popular
macro models. Despite this, evidence on the role of financial frictions in the propagation of mone-
tary policy to firms remains limited. Part of the problem lies in measuring financial frictions and
how these may constrain firm behaviour. The existing literature has proposed a number of proxies
but with a variety of results; this is still an area of ongoing debate and it remains unclear what the
best proxy might be.
To tackle this, we build on insights from a large body of work in corporate finance showing
that many proxies of financial constraints are highly correlated, both with each other and with
other (non-financial) factors. Common measures such as leverage, size, Tobin’s Q or liquidity
are endogenous variables. Furthermore, the empirical literature on employment at the firm-level
has highlighted the crucial role of age in understanding financial frictions and firm dynamics (e.g.
Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Fort et al. (2013) and Dinlersoz et al. (2018))). Until now, however, this
proxy has gained little attention in the macro-monetary literature on investment, possibly reflecting
limited data availability in commonly used datasets. We therefore introduce this new variable for
studying firm-level investment and show why we interpret it as a measure of ‘financial history’ or
‘corporate age’. We also document how firm age correlates with other common proxies for financial
constraints and other firm characteristics.
Using nearly 30 years of detailed firm-level panel data for U.S. and U.K. public firms, together
with state-of-the-art time-series identification of monetary policy shocks (Gurkaynak et al. (2005),
Gertler and Karadi (2015))), we provide new evidence of how, and why, monetary policy affects
firms. To the extent that financial frictions are important, we cannot understand why firms adjust
capital expenditure when interest rates change without examining how different forms of corporate
finance are affected. Our goal is, therefore, to systematically document the response of the firm
balance sheet to monetary policy. On the asset side we ask: which firms adjust their capital
expenditure the most when interest rates change? And how important are these firms for explaining
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the aggregate response found in the macro literature? On the liabilities side, we document how
different forms of corporate finance — e.g. debt, equity and cash-flows — are affected by monetary
policy changes. Since theoretical models with financial frictions have important predictions for
corporate finance variables — not just for investment — a main contribution of our paper is to
show that the response of the firm balance sheet can shed light on the channels through which
monetary policy affects investment.
We document five new findings. First, age is a robust predictor of significant heterogeneity in the
response of investment. Younger firms make the largest and most significant adjustment in capital
expenditure; older firms exhibit a small and insignificant response. Second, this heterogeneity is even
more stark when we condition on younger firms paying no dividends and, importantly, holds true
conditional on a wide range of other firm characteristics. For example, we show that smaller firms
respond more but, within this group, it is the younger non-dividend payers that drive the result.
We document a range of similar findings based on liquidity, leverage, firm growth and Tobin’s Q.
Third, younger/no-dividends firms account for more than 75% of the overall dynamic effects of
monetary policy on aggregate investment. Fourth, turning to the sources of firm finance, we find
that net worth falls considerably for all groups but borrowing only declines for the younger/no-
dividends group. In contrast, earnings and sales decline less markedly and more homogeneously
across groups. Fifth, the borrowing of young/no-dividends firms is highly correlated with collateral
values but is far less correlated with earnings. Conversely, the borrowing of older dividend payers
is mostly earnings-based.
These findings are consistent with a balance sheet channel of monetary policy for firms. For
example, financial frictions may force younger companies to borrow against collateral, the value
of which may be exposed to macroeconomic shocks. Alternatively, firms might be exposed to
fluctuations in asset values because borrowing is tied to net worth as a result of agency problems
(leading to an external finance premium). Higher interest rates generate a fall in asset prices which
lowers the value of firms’ assets. Tighter financial conditions lead to a fall in investment.1 These
predictions are very consistent with the balance sheet response of younger firms paying no dividends
1Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) are classic references on these types of mechanisms.
we find in the data. On the other hand, our evidence shows that older firms and dividend payers
are less likely to be constrained by the value of their assets and seem less exposed to this type of
amplification mechanism.
Our empirical strategy uses firm-level data from Worldscope for the U.K. and Compustat for
the U.S.. These datasets have excellent coverage of balance sheet variables and are panel datasets
with a long time dimension, which is necessary to examine the dynamic effects of monetary policy.
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Despite these benefits, one potential drawback is that these datasets focus on public firms. That
said, public firms account for between 50% and 60% of aggregate business investment and the growth
rates from the micro data and aggregate official statistics are highly correlated.2 Our results are
therefore informative about a large proportion of the aggregate effects of monetary policy. To the
extent that financial constraints are likely to be tighter for private firms than for public firms, our
findings might represent a lower bound for the role of firm finance and financial frictions in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Our new proxy for financial constraints is based on firm age. This turns out to be an excellent
sufficient statistic for a range of characteristics typically associated with credit constraints such
as being smaller, having low credit scores and lower earnings. Importantly, however, age is pre-
determined, does not respond to monetary policy and the assignment of firms to age groups is not
sensitive to arbitrary decisions about what defines, for example, a small firm or a highly levered
firm. Compustat only features a sparsely populated variable based on the Initial Public Offering
(IPO) date. In contrast, Worldscope contains incorporation dates for the vast majority of public
firms in both the United Kingdom and the United States.3
To study the dynamic effects of monetary policy we need a series of identified shocks. This
ensures that our exogenous variation is not driven by other macro factors and also limits any po-
tential reverse causality issues. We isolate a time series of monetary policy shocks by exploiting the
high frequency surprises in interest rate futures contracts within a 30 minute window around policy
announcements, following Gurkaynak et al. (2005), Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018a). We then employ a local projection instrumental variable panel approach and
estimate the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks on firms. One flexible feature of the local
2The micro data can be aggregated and then compared to official business investment data from the Office for
National Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, as in Appendix A.
3Our decision to focus on age since incorporation is driven by data availability. But, in the next section, we show
suggestive evidence that both age since incorporation and age since foundation correlate similarly with other firms
characteristics in a way that is consistent with both containing information about the length of a firms history or
experience in the credit market.
projection technique is that we can estimate non-parametrically the dynamic effects across firms
by interacting our monetary shock with bins of the age/size/leverage/liquidity/growth distribution.
This allows us to estimate impulse response functions for different groups of firms and examine
which group drives the aggregate response. The strategy also allows us to conduct multivariate
heterogeneity analysis, flexibly defining our bins based on the outer product of various firm char-
acteristics (for example younger and smaller vs. younger and larger, or younger and lower levered
vs. older and lower levered). In this sense, we can study the response of different variables by age,
conditioning on size, growth, leverage and liquidity in a non-parametric manner. By jointly study-
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ing key aspects of the firm balance sheet, we can shed light on whether the results for particular
groups are consistent with the predictions of various financial frictions models.
Related literature. A selected review of the more theoretical contributions on financial frictions
and firm dynamics will be covered in the next section, and this will serve as a motivation for our
empirical strategy. Here, we summarize how our work relates to three independent, but related,
branches of macro research using firm-level data.
A well-established empirical literature, exemplified by the studies of Davis et al. (1996), Halti-
wanger et al. (2013), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018) and Dinlersoz et al. (2018), has shown that
corporate age is a key determinant of employment and leverage dynamics over the business cycle.4
Relative to these influential works, we focus on identified monetary policy shocks and investigate
the dynamic responses of investment, borrowing, net worth and cash flows at the firm-level across
different demographic groups.
Another important strand of research has looked at debt covenants and reports pervasive hetero-
geneity in asset-based versus earning-based lending (Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2017), Lian and
Ma (2018), Drechsel (2018)). Covas and Den Haan (2011) and Begenau and Salomao (2018) study
debt versus equity issuance by firm size over the business cycle. The significant role of collateral
constraints for firms is the focus of Chaney et al. (2012), Liu et al. (2013) and Bahaj et al. (2018).
Relative to these contributions, we look at heterogeneity in borrowing and other sources of funds
by age and, more importantly, we associate it with heterogeneity in the investment responses to
monetary policy shocks.
4Similarly, a long standing tradition in the empirical analysis of household expenditure survey data has advocated
age as a proxy for access to financial markets and an important driver of consumption dynamics (see for instance,
Attanasio and Browning (1995) for a classical reference and Wong (2018) for a more recent contribution).
A large empirical literature on investment has proposed various proxies for financial constraints,
including cash flows (Fazzari et al. (1988), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)), size (Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994), Crouzet and Mehrotra (2017)), paying dividends (Fazzari et al. (1988), Farre-Mensa and
Ljungqvist (2016)), bank debt (Ippolito and Ozdagli (2018)), leverage (Ottonello and Winberry
(2018)) and liquidity (Jeenas (2018)).5 Relative to these proxies, we find that age has stronger
predictive power for the effects on investment. More importantly, we explore heterogeneity in the
effects of monetary policy on net worth, debt and cash flows, and show that looking at how different
forms of firm finance respond is crucial to shed light on the monetary transmission to investment.
5Several later studies have warned that the investment sensitivity to cash flows should not be interpreted as evidence
in favour of financial frictions as cash flows can be shown to be a determinant of investment in both theoretical models
with and without financial frictions (see for instance Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Gomes (2001a)).
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Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we discuss selected theoretical contributions that help
frame and guide our empirical analysis. This also formalizes the link between firm finance and
investment. In Section 3, we present the data, the construction of our proxy for age and how firms’
balance sheet variables and other characteristics vary over a firm’s life-cycle. In Section 4, we lay out
our empirical framework and identification strategy before presenting the average effect in our firm-
level panel data. The heterogeneous adjustment in capital expenditure following an unanticipated
interest rate change is the focus of Section 5, where we emphasize that our newly constructed
measure of age is a stronger predictor of a larger capital expenditure response than size, asset
growth, Tobin’s Q, leverage or liquidity. In Section 6, we report the responses of several balance
sheet variables and find that while net worth declines for all firms after a monetary tightening,
borrowing declines only for younger firms. We also show that younger firms’ debt is more exposed
to asset values fluctuations, against the backdrop of an increase in interest payments. Finally,
we document that the response of cash-flows is more homogeneous across firms. In the on-line
Appendices, we conduct an extensive set of further, complementary analyses and robustness checks
along many possible dimensions of heterogeneity.
2 Financial frictions and firm dynamics in theory
To guide and organize our empirical analysis, we first summarize key aspects of the theoretical lit-
erature. Several frameworks emphasize the role of financial frictions in the transmission of macroe-
conomic shocks. Broadly, we group these contributions into three sets: studies that examine asset
value/net worth channels in representative agent models; theories that emphasize age and growth
prospects in the presence of firm heterogeneity; and, studies that link firm dynamics with different
corporate finance decisions.
In the first set of contributions, more grounded in the traditions of the macro literature, con-
straints on a firm’s ability to finance its operations have been typically captured by introducing
asymmetric information and imperfect contract enforceability in models with a representative firm.6
Classic references include Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke
et al. (1999). In these models, asset values and net worth play a key role in propagating and am-
plifying shocks. This is either because assets have to be used as collateral for borrowing or because
the value of net worth reflects the probability of default leading to an external finance premium
(the so-called “financial accelerator” as in, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999)). As argued by
Catherine et al. (2018), the main robust prediction of these mechanisms is that movements in net
6Although the distribution of leverage in these models is degenerate, this simplification comes with the advantage
of being able to analyse the feedback between investment and endogenous asset prices.
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worth/collateral values can heavily influence borrowing and investment dynamics. Our joint empir-
ical analysis of both capital expenditure and different forms of corporate finance will shed light on
the role of this type of mechanism.
The second literature models heterogeneity along multiple dimensions to study how these affect
firm dynamics. Life cycle aspects can be important. Generating such multidimensional heterogene-
ity in a firm dynamic model is challenging but a number of important contributions by Cooley and
Quadrini (2001), Gomes (2001b), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Khan and Thomas (2013)
have successfully incorporated financial constraints (implicitly or explicitly modelling the underlying
friction) as well as non-convexities/irreversibilities in investment into the standard firm dynamic
model with decreasing returns to scale technology.7 In these models age is important. Younger
firms, reflecting their higher growth prospects and/or risk, are more financially constrained and
change their borrowing and investment more significantly following a shock. These frameworks
match several moments of the dynamics of growth and investment rates by age (conditional on size)
and by size (conditional on age) in the data (mainly on manufacturing firms).8 In these models, it
7It is technically difficult to model such multidimensional heterogeneity in a firm dynamic model in a frictionless
environment with constant return to scale production technologies, or in models where firms face the same financial
friction and productivity shock (see Bayer (2006)).
8Most of the early literature on firm dynamics focused heterogeneity in growth and investment rates by age and size,
matching the unconditional dynamics in the data, either across the age dimension (through a learning mechanism as
in Jovanovic (1982)) or across the size dimension (through the persistence of technology innovations as in Hopenhayn
(1992)). Conditional on size/age, all firms are identical and therefore make the same decisions.
is usually the case that firms start with debt-financed investment and then, as they approach their
efficient level, invest less and so tend to pay off their debts. These models predict that leverage
should decrease with age.9
The third strand of work focuses on firm finance and highlights that a firm’s leverage is not
necessarily the best predictor of how that firm responds to shocks: the relationship between leverage
and age/size depends on how frictions are modelled. Lian and Ma (2018) document pervasive
heterogeneity in how loan contracts are specified for different U.S. companies. Although many
firms use assets as collateral, a sizable share of them have debt covenants drawn on their earnings.
Following a shock, this may generate heterogeneous investment responses, even if all firms experience
the same fall in asset values.10 In Begenau and Salomao (2018), entrepreneurs can finance their
investment with both internal accumulated liquidity or external funds, such as debt and equity.
9In the firm dynamics literature, corporate age has also been associated with experience and the possibility of
learning about features that affect how a firm reacts to shocks: earning uncertainty, managing customers and suppliers,
etc. For instance, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) consider a model with heterogeneity in productivity and age across plants,
which they refer to as organizational capital. This type of intangibility captures how much knowledge a plant has
accumulated in order to operate a given technology. Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) and Rampini et al. (2014)
focus, instead, on how firms of different experience engage in risk management so as to avoid being exposed to
future unwanted fluctuations. Younger/more constrained firms might very well be less able/willing to engage in such
management practices, therefore being more vulnerable to future shocks.
10Asset-versus-earnings based constraints have been recently studied in general equilibrium by Drechsel (2018).
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Firms face an external finance premium because they can default on their debt, although this also
has a tax-advantage over equity. On the other hand, there is a cost of issuing equity and all firms
face a fixed operating cost. Conditional on a given degree of leverage, smaller/younger firms are
riskier than larger firms. This is because the fixed operating cost makes smaller/younger firms more
exposed to bad earnings shocks and they therefore default. In equilibrium, younger firms face a
higher external finance premium and end up relatively less levered.
In summary, several key points are relevant for our empirical strategy. First, to understand
the transmission of monetary policy to investment, we need to look at a broad range of firm char-
acteristics, including age. Whether a particular firm characteristic predicts financial frictions will
often depends on the specific model. Consequently, we need to look at the responses of all the
different forms of firm finance, including borrowing. All these theories have different implications
for how a firm’s financial variables will respond to shocks. By examining all these variables in the
data, our findings can be used to understand which theoretical mechanism(s) might account for the
response of investment. Without considering (all these dimensions of) corporate finance, it is hard
to evaluate why investment responds in a particular way to changes in monetary policy.
3 A new ‘age’ for firms
In this section, we briefly describe the micro data from firm-level balance sheet and income state-
ments and the main variables of interest for our empirical analysis. Most of the variables used are
standard in the literature, so we relegate a detailed description of sources, definitions and sample
selection to Appendix A. Here we propose and focus on a simple proxy for a firm’s track record
in the credit market, which we loosely refer to as ‘age’, and show how this demographic measure
correlates with a number of firms’ characteristics. The age dimension has been so far overlooked
in the empirical analysis on firms’ investment decisions, but it will play an important role in our
analysis.
Detailed and high quality balance sheet and income statement data for publicly listed companies
are available on a quarterly basis from Compustat for the United States and on a fiscal year basis
from Thomson Reuters’ WorldScope for the United Kingdom. In WorldScope, British firms report
in different months throughout the year but each firm tends to report always in the same month
across years. This allows us to exploit monthly variation in annual changes for the U.K.. Consistent
information for a sufficiently large number of firms in both dataset only begins in 1986, when our
sample starts. The sample ends in 2016, when the data were collected for this project. Turning
to our main variables of interest, the investment rate is defined as capital expenditures in period t
relative to the level of physical capital, as measured by net plant, property and equipment at the
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beginning of the period. For the U.K., this information refers to activity throughout the reporting
period (the fiscal year); for the U.S., these data are based on calendar quarters.11 In addition to
being a widely-used measure in the empirical literature on investment (see for example Chaney et al.
(2012)), it allows us to compare the investment decision of firms with different levels of capital. The
main corporate finance variables of interest are cash-flows, which we proxy with EBITDA (earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and allowances) as is common in the literature, total and long
term debt, net worth/market value of equity (the product of common shares outstanding multiplied
by the price), share prices and interest expenditure. We therefore jointly examine the response
of internal funds, debt and equity. In our analysis we will also use information on cash dividends
paid, firm size (book value of total assets), leverage (total debt divided by the book value of total
assets), liquidity (short term cash and investments divided by the book value of total assets), growth
11Although data are assigned to calendar quarters in Compustat, some variables are cumulative within the fiscal
year. In line with the literature, we difference these variables within the fiscal year to reconstruct the quarterly series.
(growth in total assets), Tobin’s (average) Q (the ratio of market value of assets to book value).12
More detailed information on data sources, variable definitions and sample selection are provided
in Appendix A.
A long-standing literature using micro-data on firm-level employment has strongly advocated
an important role for age (since foundation) as a driver of aggregate employment growth as well as
a source of heterogeneity across firms over the business cycle (e.g. Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and
Fort et al. (2013)) but this ‘demographic’ dimension has been typically overlooked in the empirical
literature on firm-level investment.13 A possible reason for this is that most of the research on
investment has focused on U.S. Compustat data where age is based on IPO date and is sparsely
populated.14 Interestingly, however, the incorporation year is available for the vast majority of
publicly listed companies in the United States and the United Kingdom from WorldScope. Hence,
we merge these datasets to provide a consistent measure of firm age in both countries: the number
of years since incorporation.15 Importantly, age is an exogenous characteristic and is a function
of predetermined decisions about incorporation. The identification of firms by age is also not
sensitive to decisions about what defines, for example, a small firm or a highly leveraged firm.
These endogenous characteristics vary over a firm’s life, vary at high frequency and, as we shall see,
respond to monetary policy.
12We proxy size using total assets rather than employment because the employment variable is less well populated.
13Analogously, a large empirical literature using micro data on household expenditure has advocated a very signif-
icant role for age in driving consumption dynamics over the life-cycle and over the business cycle (see for instance
Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002)).
14The age variable in Centre for Research in Security Prices database, which can be easily merged into Compustat,
is based on the start of the stock market data.
15In the minority of cases where this is missing, we use the number of years since IPO from the Centre for Research
in Security Prices database.
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Our goal is to construct a proxy for a firm’s track record or financial history in credit markets and
use this variable — together with size, leverage, liquidity and other characteristics — to explore the
heterogeneous response of capital expenditure to interest rate changes. For this purpose, the number
of years since incorporation compares well with the number of years since foundation. Furthermore,
while it is possible to exploit information on the founding years, these are only available for a limited
number of companies in either dataset.16 Years since incorporation will therefore be our proxy for
firm age. Importantly, however, the descriptive statistics reported in this section are very similar
to the correlations reported by Dinlersoz et al. (2018), who measure age as years since foundation
16This can be done in the United States using Jay Ritter’s database and we have verified that our main findings
are robust to exploiting years since foundation as a measure of age in this more selected sample of firms.
among all publicly listed companies using the U.S. Census Bureaus Longitudinal Business Database
from 2005-2012.
A simple but formal way of assessing the association between our new measure of financial age
and other firm characteristics is to regress each of the characteristics of interest against a polynomial
on age together with a measure of firm size (for all firms’ characteristics regressions but the one
for size) and the interaction between sector and year fixed effects to clean for common trends at
the sectoral level. This specification is similar to the one used by Dinlersoz et al. (2018) and this
facilitates a comparison with their results based on administrative data.17 Our dependent variables
in Figure 1a are (i) size in the first row (ii) asset growth in the second row, (iii) Tobin’s Q in the
third row and (iv) EBITDA (as a share of past assets) in the fourth row. In Figure 1b, we report
the relationship between age and selected firms’ financial variables such as: (v) leverage in the first
row, (vi) the probability of having paid dividends or buy backs in the previous year or having issued
bonds ever in the second row, (vii) credit performance — measured by credit ratings in the small
sample of U.S. bond issuers and credit scores in the full sample of U.K. listed firms — in the third
row and (viii) liquidity in the last row.18
The top row of Figure 1a reveals that firm size is monotonically increasing with age for both
the U.S. (left column) and the U.K. (right column), independent of whether we use the full sample
17As a robustness check, we use instead a set of dummies that capture the position of each firm in any given year
within the distribution of age. In practice, we categorize each firm-year observation into an age quintile so that the
corresponding dummy takes value of one if a firm-year belongs to that quintile and zero otherwise. Results using this
semi-parametric approach are similar. It is also worth noting that while we focus on age rather than birth cohorts,
the empirical specifications behind the charts in Figures 1a and 1b include time fixed effects (interacted with industry
fixed effects). This implies that the evidence in this section can be interpreted as evidence on firm dynamics over
their life-cycle.
18The chart on credit scores for the U.K. (made available to us by Bahaj et al. (2018)) refers to the universe of listed
companies based on the Companies House information recorded in the Bureau van Dijk database. The chart on credit
ratings for the U.S. comes from the Centre for Research in Security Prices and is only available for the small group
of bond issuers. More specifically, on average, every year less than 7% of U.S. traded firms issue bonds and only one
fifth have ever done so over their entire life. While credit ratings are, in principle, an appealing — albeit endogenous
— metric, the lack of coverage is one reason why finding a good proxy for financial conditions is necessary.
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of firms that record assets or the smaller sample of firms that report the number of employees. In
line with Davis et al. (1996), the second row confirms a sharp negative association between growth
and years since incorporation; the third row shows that older companies tend to experience lower
Tobin’s Q values, while the fourth row reveals that younger firms tend to have smaller or even
negative operating profits early in their corporate cycle.
Figure 1b examines the financial variables. Less experienced companies appear less leveraged
(first row),19 are less likely to pay dividends,20 or issue bonds (second row), have worse credit scores
(third row) and tend to hold a higher share of liquid assets (last row).21 In particular, the results on
the relation between leverage and age is consistent with the results based on years since foundation
for publicly listed companies in Dinlersoz et al. (2018). The statistical association of age with the
probability of paying dividends and Tobin’s Q is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical
model by Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
In summary, our descriptive analysis reveals that, on average, younger firms are smaller, have
lower cash-flows/earnings, worse credit scores and a lower probability of paying dividends. On
average, they also grow faster, have a higher Tobin’s Q, have lower leverage and more liquidity.
Furthermore, a comparison with the results in Dinlersoz et al. (2018) suggests that years since
incorporation (used in this paper) and years since foundation (used in their paper) correlate similarly
with other firm characteristics.
Finally, as a first step toward a macro analysis with micro data, we are interested in understand-
ing how much of the aggregate investment dynamics is captured by publicly traded firms.22 To do
so, we aggregate the investment reported by each firm for a given period of time into a measure
of investment at calendar frequency. The comparison with the growth rates of the aggregate series
from the BEA and ONS national statistics, which include investment by both public and private
firms, is shown in Appendix A Figure A.1. The left column refers to the U.S. and the right col-
umn to the U.K.. While publicly listed companies account for between 50% and 60% of the level
of investment in both countries, the dynamics of the capital expenditure series aggregated from
micro data are very similar to the dynamics of the official investment data. More specifically, the
correlation of the growth rate of capital expenditure from the micro data and the growth rate of of-
19As shown by Dinlersoz et al. (2018) for the U.S. and by Bahaj et al. (2018) for the U.K., the regression curve
between leverage and age is negatively sloped among private firms.
20The proportion of firms paying dividends in the US is systematically lower than in the U.K. but this may partly
reflect the (historic) tax advantage given to buying back stock. We therefore also report this probability for the U.S.
and the U.K.. As expected the probability of engaging in buy back is much larger for the U.S.. We will return to the
issue of buy backs later.
21The larger liquidity holding observed among younger firms chimes with the evidence in Bates et al. (2009), who
identify a precautionary motive (in anticipation of possible financial constraints in the future) as a main driver of
larger cash holdings among U.S. traded firms, especially non-dividend payers (which are likely to be younger firms).
22Unlike survey data where we would use sampling weights to evaluate the representativeness relative to the popu-
lation, here we are not dealing with a sampling issue as we observe the universe of publicly listed companies.
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ficial aggregate business investment is above 0.7. Understanding the dynamic behaviour of publicly
listed companies can therefore provide important information about a sizable part of transmission
of monetary policy (and other shocks) to the aggregate economy. To the extent that private firms
4.1 Identification
Identifying the dynamic causal effects of monetary policy on investment requires tackling the po-
tential reverse causality: interest rates respond to the economy and also affect it. This is a standard
problem in the empirical macro literature (see Nakamura and Steinsson (2018b) but it poses a fur-
ther specific problem in our panel micro data setting. We need our estimated effects to be driven
by exogenous changes in monetary policy, not some other macro factor that drives interest rate
changes. Furthermore, some of the firm groups we consider may account for sizeable movements in
aggregate variables and thus trigger a monetary policy responses that are correlated with conditions
in that particular group. As in the macro literature, we need some exogenous variation in policy
rates.
Our identification strategy is based on the proxy-VAR/external instrument approach of Mertens
and Ravn (2013) and Stock and Watson (2018), applied to monetary policy in the U.S. by Gertler
and Karadi (2015) and in the U.K. by Gerko and Rey (2017). The idea is to isolate interest rate
surprises using the movements in financial markets data in a short window around central bank
policy announcements. Building on Gurkaynak et al. (2005), Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Gerko
and Rey (2017) measure financial market surprises from Fed Funds Futures and Short-Sterling
Future contracts respectively, using a very short time window around the Federal Reserve and the
Bank of England policy announcements. The plausible identifying assumption is that nothing else
occurs within this time window (which could drive both private sector behavior and monetary policy
decisions). The technical innovation in Gertler and Karadi (2015), and also employed in Gerko and
face similar, or even tighter, financial conditions, our findings could be interpreted as a lower bound
on the relevance of financial constraints for the transmission of monetary policy to investment. In
the next section, we lay out our strategy for identifying monetary policy shocks and the empirical
design for the micro-data analysis.
4 Empirical framework
In this section, we describe our identification and empirical strategy. In particular, we first discuss
the way we construct the series of monetary policy shocks. We move then to our main empirical
specifications. In the final part of this section, we present the estimates of the average effect of
interest rate changes on investment in our micro-data and show this compares well with standard
results from the macro time series literature.
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Rey (2017), is to use these high frequency surprises as proxies for the true structural monetary
policy shocks in a Vector Autoregression.
Data on Fed Funds Futures and on Short-Sterling Futures are available since 1991 and 2000
respectively while the firm-level data span the period 1986-2016. One advantage of the Mertens
and Ravn (2013) and Stock and Watson (2018) proxy-VAR used by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and
Gerko and Rey (2017) is that even if the identification of the contemporaneous causal relationships
is based on the sample for which the proxy/instrument is available, the VAR can be estimated on
a longer sample. This identifies a sequence of monetary policy shocks for a longer sample. We
therefore use the implied monetary policy shocks from the Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Gerko
and Rey (2017) VAR as our measure of monetary policy shocks in the micro data. This allows us
to obtain a time series of monetary policy innovations for the full micro-data sample: 1986-2016.23
The approach also only requires the high frequency surprises to be contemporaneously exogenous
and the VAR will purge any remaining predictability. Finally, by directly following Gertler and
Karadi (2015) and Gerko and Rey (2017), our micro results will be more directly comparable to
the macro literature (as we show in Appendix C). For all these reasons this method is preferable to
using the financial surprises directly in our panel estimation.24
First, we estimate the Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Gerko and Rey (2017) reduced-form VAR
for our sample period 1986-2016, keeping as close as possible to their specification. Our goal is
to take these monetary policy shocks “off the shelf”. The VAR includes a measure of interest
rates, log industrial production, the employment rate, the log of the consumer prices index for the
U.S. and the log of the retail prices index (excluding mortgage interest payments for the U.K.), a
measure of corporate interest spreads and, for the U.K. only, the dollar-sterling exchange rate.25
The monetary policy shocks used for estimation are shown in Appendix B, together with the high-
23These can simply be obtained by inverting the structural VAR impact matrix in Gertler and Karadi (2015) and
Gerko and Rey (2017).
24This approach does not, therefore, require that the high frequency surprises are the true monetary policy shocks
(as in Ottonello and Winberry (2018) and Jeenas (2018)).
25Following Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Gerko and Rey (2017), the interest rate is the one-year government
bond yield for the U.S. and the five year gilt yields for the U.K. (as those rates maximize the instrument strength in
the first stage regressions) while the credit spread is the excess bond premium compiled by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012)) for the U.S. and the difference between the mortgage rate and the 3-month sterling bill rate used by Gerko
and Rey (2017) for the U.K.. We are grateful to Peter Karadi who has kindly provided us with an updated set of
financial market surprises to 2016. The updated Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) spreads data are available from the
authors’ websites.
frequency monetary policy surprises.
We then use these monetary policy shocks in our micro panel regressions. Since these are
exogenous disturbances, there is no need to include further macro controls. To estimate the dynamic
causal effects from the micro data, we use a panel local projection instrumental variable technique,
following Jorda et al. (2017). This is a very flexible specification that allows us to estimate impulse
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where Rt is the end-of-quarter interest rate used in the VAR above, which is instrumented using
our extracted series of monetary policy shocks summed to quarterly frequency.26 The variable yt+h
represents log real quarterly business investment and the βh refers to the impulse response function
at period h.27
In Appendix C, we show that an initial 25bp rise in the interest rate leads to a fall in business
investment of around 0.6-0.8% after two years. We also report the results for industrial production,
employment and credit spreads to show that this method produces results that are qualitatively
and quantitatively consistent with results in Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Gerko and Rey (2017).
Higher interest rates contract economic activity and investment in the aggregate. In the micro
analysis below, we will also find a similar time profile for the firm-level impulse responses but we
26It is possible to estimate these macro responses in one step using the proxy-VAR, although this requires summing
the instruments to quarterly frequency. We prefer to instrument interest rates at a monthly frequency (which is closer
to the frequency of monetary policy decisions) and estimate the quarterly IRFs ex-post. This two-step approach is
also more consistent with the way we estimate the effects on investment using the micro data but we have verified
that it has a negligible impact on the estimated effects using aggregate data.
27Generally, the error terms exhibit serial correlation, so these are corrected using the Newey-West method.
will depart significantly from the macro analysis in this section by studying various dimensions of
heterogeneity.
response functions on firm-level panel data using the identified monetary shocks as instruments for
interest rate changes. With this technique, it will then be straightforward to conduct multivariate
heterogeneity analysis in a dynamic setting.
Before turning to the precise micro-econometric specification, it is first useful to study whether
monetary policy has an effect on business investment in the data from national accounts. Official
business investment data are available at quarterly frequency. As is common in the macro literature,
we therefore sum our monetary policy shocks to quarterly frequency. A simple regression will then
allow us to uncover the impulse response functions for business investment and any other variable
of interest. To keep the specification close to the micro regressions below, we estimate the following
sequence of local projections for any horizon h:
yt+h − yt−1 = αh + βhRt + νt+h (1)
ΔhXi,t+h = γ
h
i +
G∑
g=1
βhg · I [Zi,t−1 ∈ g] ·Rt +
G∑
g=1
αhg · I [Zi,t−1 ∈ g] + i,t+h (2)
4.2 Baseline specification
In order to capture the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy, in our benchmark empirical spec-
ification, we estimate impulse response functions using an instrumental variable (IV) variation of
the local projection (LP) approach (LP-IV) proposed by Jorda (2005).
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In the U.S., t refers to quarters and we have a standard quarterly panel. We also include quarter
dummies to handle seasonality. In the U.K., different firms report in different months throughout
the year and we observe (or can construct) variables that refer to changes over the twelve months
running up to the reporting month. The subscript t refers to years but the data have a monthly
dimension. For each firm observation, the interest rate is recorded at the end of the reporting month
m in year t and we include month dummies.
The dependent variable X will be the variable of interest: the investment rate in Section 5
and net worth, borrowing and cash flows in Section 6.28 Zt−1 is a set of firm characteristics and
the indicator function takes a value of 1 if the firm characteristic falls in a particular “bin” of the
distribution, which we will refer to as the firm’s group. Importantly, Z can be multidimensional and
we can have separate slopes for finer groups, for example young/small/low leverage, old/large/high
leverage, etc. In essence, this is a non-parametric way of estimating the heterogeneous effects of
monetary policy by different (and possibly multivariate) firm characteristics. We are not, therefore,
imposing linearity in the interaction. This is something that turns out to be important and also
distinguishes us from virtually all earlier contributions working on investment heterogeneity at the
firm-level. We also do not include other time or sector-time fixed effects as we want to interpret
these coefficients as group specific impulse response functions, including any general equilibrium
effects. This allows us to estimate conditional impulse response function as flexibly as possible. But
we do add firm fixed effects, which not only absorb any sector fixed effect but also allows us to
exploit within-firm variation. The interest rate (interacted with the dummies) will be instrumented
28Our results for investment are also robust to only including changes in the investment rate of more than +/− 1%.
by the monetary policy shock (also interacted with the dummies).29 Standard errors are clustered
by firm and time, although the error bands are not particularly sensitive to clustering by other
cross-sectional units.30 Finally, we will be estimating IRFs over five years, so we restrict the sample
to only include firms we observe for at least five years.
4.3 The average effect
Before presenting the IRFs across the various groups, it is useful to report the average effect in our
firm-level panel data. This serves two purposes. First, it will shed light on the contribution of the
average publicly traded firm to the dynamics of the impulse response based on aggregate national
accounts data, where the latter (but not the former) is an object that has been thoroughly analysed
29The advantage of using the monetary shocks as instruments is that the scale of the shocks extracted from the
VAR are not pinned down. This approach allows us to interpret our impulse response functions in whatever units of
Rt we choose, rather than units of the shock.
30For the U.S. where the time dimension is sizable, we use the approach of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) which deals
with possible serial correlation in the forecast errors i,t+h which is a feature of the local projections technique. We
set the number of lags to 12.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1911
in the macro literature. Second, the average effect will provide a benchmark against which we can
evaluate the contribution of the response of each group. To estimate the average effect, we drop the
group dummies from equation 2 and replace the group-specific coefficients on the interest rate with
a single parameter βh for the full-sample and for each horizon h. We interpret βh as the average
effect of interest rates on investment at horizon h.
The left column of Figure 2 reports the impulse response function at quarterly frequency for
the U.S. while the right column refers to the yearly impulse responses for the U.K.. Both sets of
estimates cover a period of up to five years (βh for each horizon h and so twenty point estimates for
the U.S. and five point estimates for the U.K.). The investment rate declines significantly following
a 25bp rise in the interest rate in both countries. The quarterly frequency of the U.S. estimates
reveal that effect becomes significant towards the end of the first year and in both countries the
peak effect is reached between the second and third year after the shock, at a value around −0.5.31
The dynamic effects dissipate after the peak and become statistically negligible by the forecast
horizon. These dynamics are consistent with the impulse response functions using aggregate data
presented in Appendix C. This result is reassuring as it suggests that the average impulse response
31In the U.K. yearly impulse responses, the estimated value ‘on impact’ refers to the effect of capital expenditure
within the first year after the shock. So the significant response within the first year for the U.K. impulse responses is
consistent with the significant estimate in the fourth quarter after the shock for the U.S. quarterly impulse responses.
In Appendix D, we report the U.S. average effect both at quarterly and yearly frequency so as to make visually easier
for the readers to appreciate the similarities of the capital expenditure dynamics in the two countries.
5 The response of investment across firms
for the investment rate estimated from the micro data lines up with the macro response of business
investment conventionally estimated using official national statistics. The firms in our sample are
therefore responsible for a significant share of aggregate investment dynamics following a monetary
policy shock. Furthermore, this average result gives us a meaningful benchmark against which to
study the heterogeneous responses of capital expenditure across different groups of firms. In the
next section our goal is therefore to “disaggregate” this average effect and see which groups drive
the response and why. We will do this in two steps. First we look at the asset side of the balance
sheet and examine heterogeneity in the investment adjustment by age (and other common proxies).
We then explore the responses of the source of funds, namely equity, debt and cash flows, and ask
how consistent is the behaviour of both financing variables and capital expenditure with a firm
balance sheet channel of monetary policy.
In this section, we look at the asset side of the corporate balance sheet and focus specifically on
capital expenditure, given its importance in the macro-monetary literature. Our goal is to establish
which firms are most sensitive to monetary policy, how important are these firms for the aggregate
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response, and how well our new proxy of financial experience predicts heterogeneity in the response
of investment.
We begin by focusing on the response of investment by ‘corporate age’, namely the number of
years since incorporation. We examine how these results compare to more traditional proxies based
on size, asset growth, leverage and liquidity. Age is a far more robust predictor of heterogeneity in
the response of investment. We then consider a refinement of this demographic grouping strategy
which splits the sample further according to whether a company has paid dividends or not in the
past. We present three main results: (i) when grouping by age, heterogeneity in the investment
response is far more pronounced than the differences found when grouping firms by any other charac-
teristic; (ii) relative to any single dimension, the heterogeneity is even sharper when considering age
and dividend status; (iii) this heterogeneity by age and dividend status is robust to controlling for
size, asset growth, leverage and liquidity using a triple sorting strategy. In particular, for the most
monetary-policy-sensitive group of firms by size, asset growth, leverage and liquidity, the response
is always driven by the younger non-dividend payers. This highlights the risks of conditioning only
on one of these other (endogenous) characteristics. For instance, some highly levered firms might
5.1 Results based on corporate age (and other characteristics)
be riskier. But highly levered companies may also be safer, as established firms may take on larger
projects financed more with debt than equity (as noted by Lian and Ma (2018)).
A long standing tradition in the micro-econometric analysis of expenditure survey data uses age of
the household head as a proxy for access to credit markets. The rationale for such an interpretation
is that younger households are typically less experienced, have a shorter credit history and a lower
credit score, earn a lower income and therefore are more likely to face tighter financial conditions.
On the firms’ side, the demographic dimension has been extensively investigated in the empirical
literature on employment at the firm-level, especially using census data. But, although age is a
proxy for a firm’s growth prospects in models where these firms face financial constraints (e.g.
Cooley and Quadrini (2001)), we are unaware of studies using firm age in the context of capital
expenditure.
Our goal is to measure the experience of a firm in financial markets or the length of corporate
credit history. As argued in Section 3, and in a parallel to the consumption literature, years since
incorporation is likely to be correlated with this credit history. We refer to our newly constructed
variable as ‘corporate age’ or simply ‘age’ for short. More specifically, as explained in Section 4.1, we
allow the effects of monetary policy to vary across the age distribution. We split the distribution into
three bins/groups depending on whether, at the time of the monetary shock, they were incorporated
less than fifteen years ago (‘younger’), between fifteen and fifty years (‘middle-aged’) or more than
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32Further, when we do double- and triple-sorted later we will collapse this to younger and older firms based on the
fifteen year threshold. This leaves the two groups evenly populated. Of course, these “younger” firms are not young
in an absolute sense, so we avoid the term young vs. old.
fifty years (‘older’). While there is no conceptual reason to prefer one specific age cutoff over another
the results are not sensitive to the precise cut-off.32
The capital expenditure responses by age are reported in Figure 3: the top row refers to younger
firms, the middle row to middle-aged firms and the bottom row to older firms. The left column
presents estimates for the United States while the right column for the United Kingdom. Three
results are clear. First, there are considerable differences across groups. Second, the investment of
younger firms is by far the most responsive: following a 25 basis points unanticipated increase in the
interest rate, the investment rate falls by around 1% two-three years after the shock, before returning
to zero. The effect is insignificant by the fourth year. Second, middle-aged firms and especially
older firms reduce their capital expenditure by a far smaller and amount, around 0.25%. The effect
is also often insignificant for most — if not all — of the period. Third, despite the differences in
productivity and capital market structures between the U.S. and the U.K., the behaviour of firms
along the age dimension, especially younger companies, is very similar across the two countries. The
main difference is that the response of middle-aged firms is slightly more pronounced in the U.S..
Given the average effects reported in Figure 2, and given the high correlation between aggregated
micro data and national statistics in Figure A.1, the estimates in Figure 3 already suggest that
younger firms account for most of the dynamic response of investment in the aggregate economy.
We will quantify this more precisely below.
Results based on other (endogenous) firm characteristics. An important advantage of
using incorporation date to sort firms into different demographic groups is that a firm’s incorporation
date is fully pre-determined and thus invariant to changes in monetary policy or the business cycle.
Splitting the sample along other dimensions which endogenously respond to the shock or change
frequently over the business cycle is, in contrast, problematic.
Policy changes, and business cycle fluctuations in general, could change the ranking of firms in
the distribution of the variable used to create the bins/groups. This blurs the distinction between
lower and higher groups, which are defined according to the ex-ante distribution. As a result, it is
harder to interpret any (ex-post) heterogeneity as being driven exclusively (or even partially) by
ex-ante differences in that particular firm characteristics. Heterogeneity in the capital expenditure
response suggests total assets might respond heterogeneously. Bahaj et al. (2018) show that a
firm’s number of employees (another commonly used measure of size) responds to monetary policy,
especially among younger firms. In Section 6.1, we find heterogeneity in the response of debt,
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implying that leverage endogenously responds. In Section 6.4 we show that cash flows and liquidity
vary significantly in response to monetary policy.
Despite all these caveats, for the purposes of completeness and for comparison with other papers
in the literature, we now examine heterogeneity in the response of capital expenditure allowing the
impulse response functions to vary across the size, asset growth, leverage and liquidity distribu-
tions.33 For each of these alternative characteristics, we assign firms to groups based upon their
position in the distribution during the previous year. This is akin to non-parametrically estimating
33In Appendix E, we look at heterogeneity by Tobin’s Q as an alternative proxy (relative to asset growth) for
heterogeneity in growth prospects.
the effects of monetary policy by the variable of interest. For presentational reasons we report
responses for lowest quartile, the middle two quartiles and the highest quartile of the variable of
interest (e.g. size/leverage/growth etc.)
The full set of estimates are reported in Appendix E. Here, we summarize three main results.
First, there seems to be little heterogeneity when splitting the sample by asset growth and Tobin’s
Q. This is important because younger companies may simply face better growth opportunities than
older firms. The results in Figures E.4 and E.5, however, suggest that this interpretation is unlikely
to account for the heterogeneity in capital expenditure by age reported in Figure 3.34 Second, firms
that are smaller size, have lower leverage or have higher liquidity tend to adjust investment more
than firms in the rest of the distribution.35 Third, the heterogeneity by size, leverage and liquidity
in Appendix E appears less pronounced than the heterogeneity by age presented in Figure 3.36 For
34By definition, older companies have lived for longer and therefore, one may be concerned about survivorship rates
among younger firms. Two main considerations, however, make this issue empirically less relevant in the present
context. First, among younger firms, we find no heterogeneity when we further divide them according to their
productivity or profitability, as measured for instance by high and low asset growth or high and low Tobins Q. To the
extent that asset growth and Tobins Q are correlated with the unobserved characteristics driving survivorship, then
the lack of heterogeneity across these high and low groups suggests that this concern is unlikely to affect our estimates.
Second, any survivorship issue would most likely bias downward our estimates for the younger firms and thus the
extent of heterogeneity we uncover would be, if anything, a lower bound. The reason is that the exiting firms would
be more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations and monetary policy, which is why they stop capital expenditure and
terminate their business in the face of an adverse shock. In other words, either monetary policy shocks have little
impact on firms exit (and thus our estimates are unaffected) or if they do, their correlation with investment would be
far more negative than for surviving firms and therefore the true extent of heterogeneity in the micro data would be
even larger than what we report.
35Lower levered and higher liquidity firms tend also to be younger, smaller, have lower credit rating, little earnings
and are less likely to pay out dividends or issue bonds. This is consistent with the evidence in Opler et al. (1999),
Han and Qiu (2007) and Bates et al. (2009), who document that firms with lower debt and higher cash holdings are
more likely financially constrained.
36As noted by Ottonello and Winberry (2018), the evidence based on grouping firms by leverage is not robust and
one may find that the investment of lower or higher levered companies responds most depending on whether the firms
grouping is based on leverage in the last period (as in Ottonello and Winberry (2018)) or is based on an average of
leverage over the last few periods (as in Jeenas (2018)). While there is no substantive reason to prefer one definition
to the other, the lack of robustness of the findings by leverage groups is consistent with the view that leverage is an
endogenous variable and its distribution is not rank-invariant to the business cycle or the monetary policy shocks.
This makes leverage an unattractive dimension along which to group firms. Age, in contrast, is fully predictable
(independently of business cycle fluctuations) as the incorporation date has been set at least several years before
the shock hits. Indeed, this is a main reason why age has proved such a popular grouping strategy in the empirical
literature on firm-level employment and household-level expenditure.
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example, both low and high leverage firms respond more than firms in the middle of the leverage
distribution, but these differences are not sizable. We find some evidence that smaller firms respond
more than larger firms, but again the heterogeneity is less pronounced than the heterogeneity by
age. Older firms do tend to be larger, but not all older firms are large and not all larger firms are old.
We will come back to this last set of results in Section 5.4 where we show that the heterogeneity in
the investment responses by age is robust to conditioning on size, asset growth, Tobin’s Q, leverage
37Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) provide suggestive evidence that being young or not paying dividends may
also proxy for a firm’s position in its life cycle rather than for financial constraints only. In Section 5.4, however, we
will show that in our data there is little heterogeneity among younger non-dividend payers when we further divide
this group into faster-growing and slower-growing firms or into companies with higher and lower Tobin’s Q.
38Similar results are obtained using linear probability models, logit or probit specifications, with the latter however
subject to the incidental parameter problem.
39This is consistent with the finding that paying dividends seems an almost ‘absorbing’ state in the data: once firms
begin to pay dividends, they rarely stop do so in normal times. In contrast, a firm’s decision to engage in buy backs
appears far more cyclical, possibly because of their uncertain future returns or their different tax treatment.
A number of earlier contributions have argued that not paying dividends or not buying back shares
could signal a different capital structure and thus a different access to financial markets.37 To the
extent that age does not fully capture the presence or, possibly, the severity of credit constraints,
splitting our sample also along the dividends/buyback dimension (over and above demographics)
may sharpen the identification of firms facing financial frictions.
Of course, as noted above, a potential drawback of this further sample split is that paying
dividends or buying back shares may also be a firm’s endogenous response to changes in monetary
policy. To formally assess this hypothesis, we run a set of panel regressions in which the left hand
side variable takes the value of one if a firm at time t − 1 paid dividends/bought back shares
and zero otherwise. The regressors are firm fixed effects and two years of monetary policy shocks
interacted with dummies for each age group.38 We run separate panel regressions for firms paying
dividends and for firms buying back shares to assess the cyclicality of each of these financial choices
in isolation. In both countries, we find that the monetary policy shocks are significant predictors of
whether a firm buys backs shares whereas the probability of paying dividends in any given period is
not statistically affected by changes in the interest rate.39 Accordingly, we exclude buybacks from
the sub-grouping strategy of this section and focus exclusively on further splitting the age groups
between firms that have and have not paid dividends in the previous year.
To minimize the number of groups, we collapse middle-aged and older firms into one group
(motivated by the results in Figure 3 and to maximize observations per group) and interact these
and liquidity, whereas the heterogeneity in the other characteristics becomes far less pronounced
once we control for age (see Appendix F).
5.2 A refinement based on paying dividends status
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two age groups with a binary indicator of whether the firm paid dividends in the previous year.
This produces four groups. The first row of Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions for
younger firms (less than fifteen years since incorporation) and the second row reports the results
40For completeness, in Appendix E, we also report the impulse response functions based only on past dividend
status (Figure E.6) or based only on whether the firm has issued bonds in the past (Figure E.7). On average, only
20% of companies ever issue bonds in the U.S. and only 10% in the U.K.. The vast majority of non-bond issuers does
not pay dividends. The results in Figures E.6 and E.7 reveal that the aggregate response of investment is driven by
neither dividend payers nor bond issuers as we never record a larger (and in most cases not even significant) response
for these groups.
41Older and larger firms paying dividends typically make a significantly larger contribution to the aggregate level
of investment whereas younger firms account for about 30%. It is worth to emphasize, however, than in this paper
we focus on changes in investment (induced by a monetary policy shock) rather than its level and therefore, as we
shall see, the contribution of younger firms to that could be, and indeed is, much larger.
for older firms (more than fifteen years since incorporation). The first column in each block refers
to non-dividend payers and the second column refers to dividend payers. The two blocks reports
results for the U.S. and the U.K.. Comparing the two rows reveals the marginal contribution of
age, controlling for dividend status. Comparing the columns reveals the marginal contribution of
paying dividends, controlling for age.
There are three main results from Figure 4. First, for younger firms, the investment of younger
non-dividend payers accounts for the bulk of the effect in the left panel of Figure 3. On average
the response of younger non-dividend payers is twice as large (at the peak) as for those paying
dividends. Second, for non-dividend payers, younger firms (top row, columns 1 and 3) have the
largest and most significant response, with the peak effect exceeding 1% in the U.S. and around
1.5% in the U.K.. Third, the adjustment of capital expenditure for older dividend payers (bottom
row, columns 2 and 4) is both statistically and economically insignificant, being on average only
one fifth than the response of younger firms who paid no dividends.40
In summary, we have further refined the estimates in Figure 3 by showing that younger firms
paying no dividends largely account for the average response documented in Section 4.3.
5.3 Contribution to the aggregate investment response
The evidence in Figure 4 suggests that younger non-dividend payers are likely to drive the average
effect estimated in Figure 2 and are, therefore, also likely to make a very significant contribution to
the aggregate response of investment to monetary policy shocks.41 To show this more formally, we
compute the share of the average investment response accounted for by each of the four age/dividend
groups. For each set of firms in Figure 4, we first compute the (discounted) cumulated percent change
of capital expenditure over the forecast horizon and then multiply this by the average investment
share of each group (relative to the total investment in the sample). Dividing this object by the sum
of the same statistics for all groups provides an estimate of the contribution of that group to the
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average response of investment.42 Table 1 shows the findings. The estimates are striking: younger
firms paying no dividends account for around three quarters of the average effect of monetary policy
on capital expenditure in both countries.
While the estimates in Table 1 refer to the contribution of each group to the average effect,
it is straightforward to generalize these findings to the contribution of each group to the (whole-
economy) response of aggregate investment to a monetary policy shock. These back-of-the-envelope
calculations depends on an assumption about the investment elasticity of private firms, which we
do not observe in our data. But, to fix ideas and provide a range of estimated contributions, we
consider three cases. First assume that private firms are fully insensitive to monetary policy shocks.
As listed firms account for about 50% to 60% of the gross fixed capital formation in the national
statistics, this scenario implies that younger/no-dividends public firms would account for between
40% and 50% of the aggregate response. We find this scenario the least likely, nonetheless the
contribution of younger firms paying no dividends would still be very significant. Second, in the
intermediate scenario, assume that the distribution of investment responses to interest rate changes
by age and dividend status is identical for private and public firms. The estimates in Table 1 would
then represent the contribution of each group to the aggregate response. In the final scenario, the
investment sensitivity of younger non-listed companies (paying no-dividends) to monetary policy
changes is larger than the sensitivity of their listed counterparts and therefore the estimates in
Table 1 would be a lower bound for the contribution of younger non-dividend payers in the whole
economy to the response of aggregate investment to monetary policy changes.
42While this strategy ensures that the shares of all groups sum up to 100%, we have verified that similar findings
are obtained using as denominator the cumulated percentage change of the average effect in Figure 2 instead.
disappears once we condition on size.
Unlike traditional panel regression analyses in which the identification exploits exogenous vari-
ation in the cross section, our identification strategy is based on exogenous changes (in monetary
5.4 Conditioning on other firm characteristics
The evidence in the previous section reveals that being younger and paying no dividends is a strong
predictor of a larger response of investment to monetary policy changes. In Section 3, we have shown
that younger firms tend to be smaller, have worse credit ratings, are less levered and hold more
cash relative to older firms. We have also uncovered that younger firms exhibit higher asset growth,
have a higher Tobin’s Q but are far less likely to issue bonds. Above, we showed that each of these
characteristics on their own generate far less heterogeneity (if any) than age but, in this section, we
ask whether the heterogeneous responses by age/dividends grouping are robust to controlling for
size, firms’ growth, leverage and liquidity. It could be, for instance, that the heterogeneity by age
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policy) that vary over time but are common across firms, while allowing for heterogeneous slopes
along a variety of dimensions. Accordingly, the notion of controlling for other characteristics requires
a different approach than simply adding further regressors to our baseline empirical specification.
To examine the marginal contribution of age conditional on other characteristics, we interact the
four age/dividends groups with quartiles of the size/leverage/liquidity/growth distribution. This is
essentially controlling for the third variable in a fully non-parameter manner, a strategy that we
refer to as triple-cutting the data or triple sorting.
By looking at the differences between the response of smaller-younger-paying no dividends firms
and smaller-older-paying dividends companies, for instance, one can infer the marginal contribution
of age and paying dividends status for a given (smaller) size. Similarly, by comparing smaller-
younger-paying no dividends firms to larger-younger-paying no dividends companies, we will be
able to assess the marginal contribution of size for a given (younger) age and (paying no) dividends
status. As triple sorting is very demanding on the data, we maximize the number of observations
per sub-groups of companies by using only two categories for age and two categories for the other
characteristics. We maintain the same two age groups from above (based on fifteen years since
incorporation). Dividend status is already binary. In terms of the third dimension of interest,
we use the most responsive quartile from the analysis above vs. the rest of the distribution. To
stick with the size example, this means comparing the bottom quartile of size (smaller) with the
rest of the size distribution. This outer product generates eight bins. As a result, the full set of
impulse response functions for all groups are reported in Appendix F. Here, for simplicity, we focus
on younger firms paying no dividends vs. older firms paying dividends, conditional on the most
responsive group according to the third dimension.
Considering size and growth first, we report the results conditional on being smaller or having
faster growth. Figure 5 shows that among the smaller and faster-growing companies, only the
younger non-dividend payers adjust their capital expenditure significantly after a monetary policy
shock. In contrast, the investment of small and fast-growing older dividend payers is not affected
by the change in the interest rate. In other words, the larger response of smaller and faster-growing
companies in Appendix E is mostly driven by younger non-dividend payers.43 Figure 6 for liquidity
and leverage paints a very similar picture. Among the firms with lower leverage or with more
liquidity, younger non-dividend payers is always the group that responds the most and drives the
results in Appendix E. Another way to interrogate the figures in the Appendix is to ask: conditional
43In Appendix Figures F.9 and F.10, we show that this finding is robust to using Tobin’s Q instead of asset growth
to proxy a firm’s growth opportunities. This is interesting because a further concern is that older firms may be subject
to a survival bias due to being firms with higher profitability or growth prospects. This interpretation, however, is
inconsistent with the evidence in Appendix F which shows that younger firms with lower asset growth or lower Tobin’s
Q do not respond significantly less than younger firms with higher asset growth or higher Tobin’s Q.
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Understanding why capital expenditure at the firm-level is sensitive to movements in interest rates
therefore requires a detailed analysis of how monetary policy affects firm finance. This is the goal
of this section.
On the theoretical side, several studies in the firm balance sheet channel tradition of Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) emphasize that financial frictions could amplify the
transmission of monetary policy. Higher interest rates lower asset prices and push down equity
values. This may lead to a rise in the external finance premium and generate a further decline in
investment.44 Higher interest rates can also trigger falling collateral values, and lead to a tightening
of borrowing constraints whenever a significant portion of debt is secured against collateral (as in
44This is the classic financial accelerator in Bernanke et al. (1999)
In the previous section, we saw that age is a robust predictor of heterogeneity in the response of
investment to monetary policy: younger firms, especially non-dividend payers, respond considerably
but other companies react far less or hardly at all. Earlier empirical studies on consumption
using household-level data (see for instance Attanasio and Browning (1995) and more recently
Wong (2018)) and on employment using firm-level data (see for instance Davis et al. (1996) and
Haltiwanger et al. (2013)) provide evidence consistent with the notion that being young is correlated
with unobserved characteristics driving experience and access to credit markets. Earlier studies on
investment using firm-level data (see for instance Fazzari et al. (1988) and more recently Farre-
Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016)) have shown evidence consistent with the notion that non-dividend
payers face a relatively larger wedge between internal and external funding costs and thus possibly
tighter financial conditions. While this is suggestive of a possible correlation between age and
financial constraints, at this stage it is only an educated conjecture. Theoretical models of financial
frictions, however, also have predictions for the responses of different forms of corporate finance.
on being younger, do the effects vary by size, leverage, liquidity or growth? The answer is no. Once
we condition on being young/paying no dividends, the responses across firms grouped along the
third dimension are relatively homogeneous.
In summary, age and dividend status are strong predictors of significant heterogeneity in the
response of capital expenditure to changes in monetary policy. This holds true over and above
any possible heterogeneity by size, asset growth or Tobin’s Q, leverage and liquidity. Heterogeneity
along these more traditional (and arguably endogenous) firm characteristics seems weaker than the
heterogeneity based on age and dividend status. It also tends to become marginally insignificant
after controlling for age and paying dividends status.
6 Monetary policy and firm finance
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6.1 Borrowing and interest payments
To examine the role of a firm balance sheet channel, a natural place to start is with the response
of borrowing. These theories would predict that the borrowing of financially constrained firms
should respond more. Figure 7 therefore shows the response of real debt growth, which we take
as a measure of new issuance. The chart is structured using the same format of Figure 4: the
two columns on the left (right) refer to U.S (U.K.) younger firms not paying dividends and paying
dividends respectively. The two rows refer to younger and older firms, defined as before. Figure
7 shows that in both countries younger non-dividend payers change borrowing the most, following
the monetary policy shock.45
For this decline in borrowing to be consistent with a deterioration of credit conditions, younger
non-dividend payers should also be facing a higher marginal interest rate following a contractionary
monetary policy shock. While we do not observe the (marginal) interest rate at the firm-level,
we can infer its response by looking at the movement in interest payments. This is shown in
Figure 8. Interest expenditure tends to rise on impact and this is often significant. This effect is
typically reversed during the second year. At face value, the response of interest expenditure is
( )
45The decline for younger non-dividend payers applies to both short-term and long-term borrowing.
hard to interpret because this is a function of both interest rates and debt decisions. These negative
estimates, however, are insignificant and are consistent with the decline in borrowing documented
in Figure 7. In Figure 7, we showed that younger/no dividend companies borrow less when interest
rates rise. The relatively homogeneous rise in interest payments, together with a more significant
fall in borrowing for the younger/no dividend group, is consistent with a sharper rise in the marginal
interest rate for these latter firms. Ideally, one would like to test this using actual interest rate data,
but marginal interest rates are not available in our dataset. Finally, the findings in Figure 8 rules
out that the heterogeneity in capital expenditure of Figure 4 is driven by heterogeneity in cash flows
from interest payments.
This inference on the interest rate increases for younger non-dividend payers chimes with two
additional pieces of evidence. First, using data on corporate bond yields, Andreson and Cesa-
Bianchi (2018) show that the corporate spread only increases significantly for firms with a lower
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). These asset-based channels have important implications for firms’
financing decisions and their balance sheets. In this section, we look at how firms’ net worth,
share prices, borrowing, interest payments and cash flows/earnings respond to evaluate whether the
response of these variables is supportive of the view that younger non-dividend payers may face
more severe credit frictions.
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6.2 Asset value exposure
collateral values and lagged cash flows, controlling for firm fixed effects and other characteristics,
including size, leverage, liquidity and Tobin’s Q (see Lian and Ma (2018) and Drechsel (2018)).
Relative to this literature, our focus is on heterogeneity in the correlation of borrowing with asset
values and cash-flows by age/dividend status. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time.
Table 2 reports the results for both countries. In each panel, the first row displays the coefficient
on collateral values (plant, property and equipment, plus accounts receivable and inventories scaled
by total assets at the start of period t) while the second row shows the coefficient on lagged cash
flows (EBITDA scaled by lagged total assets). The two columns on the left report estimates for
younger firms (not paying dividends and paying dividends respectively) and the two columns on
the right refer to older firms.
The estimates in Table 2 offer two main insights. First, the borrowing of younger non-dividend
payers is significantly correlated only with collateral values. The coefficient on cash flows is insignif-
icant and has the wrong sign. Second, for all dividend paying groups, the coefficient on earnings is
not only very significant but also it is typically at least 50% larger than the coefficient on collateral
values. These two findings reveal that the borrowing of younger non-dividend payers is far more
correlated with asset values than is the case for older or dividend paying firms. This chimes with
credit rating (younger firms in our sample) following a tightening in monetary policy. Second,
the aggregate evidence from national statistics in Appendix C reveals that, on average, corporate
spreads and the policy rate are positively correlated after a monetary policy shock. The positive
correlation between interest rates and corporate spreads is also consistent with the evidence in
Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Caldara and Herbst (2018). The first finding is consistent with
younger firms facing more severe financial frictions; the second result is consistent with financial
frictions amplifying the effects of monetary policy.
In the previous subsection, we showed that borrowing only responds significantly for the younger/no-
dividend firms. Another prediction of models where borrowing constraints are related to asset values
is, naturally, that the borrowing of more constrained firms should be more exposed to fluctuations
in asset prices and collateral values. A growing literature, however, has noted that different firms
may face different types of financial constraints (see, for example, Lian and Ma (2018)). Some
firms’ borrowing may be more tied to their assets but others may face earnings/cash-flow based
constraints. The fall in borrowing documented above might, therefore, be more correlated with
changes in earnings than asset values.
To examine this question, in this section, we follow a very recent and promising literature on debt
covenants (covering a sample of U.S. public firms) and project changes in long-term debt on lagged
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independent evidence on debt covenants by Lian and Ma (2018) who, following our demographic
classification (but using the number of years since Initial Public Offering as proxy for age), show
that among U.S. traded companies, only the borrowing of younger firms is predominantly secured
against assets whereas the vast majority of older firms debt is secured against cash flows.
6.3 Asset values and net worth
Borrowing declines the most for younger/no-dividend firms and their debt seems more highly cor-
related with asset values. If a firm balance sheet channel is at play via asset values, we should also
see a decline net worth and/or asset prices following a monetary contraction. This is what we show
in this section. In particular, equity values and share prices decline for all firms, consistent with the
general equilibrium effects of monetary policy. As noted above, a key part of the asset-value-based
financial constraints story is that falling net worth or collateral values then leads to a tightening of
credit constraints. This is consistent with our evidence: net worth and share prices fall across the
economy, but only the constrained firms experience a fall in borrowing, and these are the firms for
whom investment responds the most.
Figure 9, shows the response of common stocks at market value.46 In keeping with the format
of the previous charts, the top (bottom) row displays the estimated impulse responses for younger
(older) firms while in the odd (even) columns we further split the sample according to whether
companies have not paid (paid) dividends in the previous year. The figure has one panel for the
U.S. and one panel for the U.K.. Figure 9 reveals a significant, sizable and persistent decline in net
worth for all groups following a contractionary monetary policy shock. The peak effect is around
-4% for younger/no dividend firms. The peak effect for the other groups is also sizable (between
-2% and -3%), somewhat less negative but not significantly so.
Another way to evaluate the response of asset values, is to look at how firms’ share prices
respond to monetary policy. This is shown in Figure 10. Similar to Figure 9, all groups witness
a large and significant drop in share prices after an interest rate hike. The effects are persistent
with a peak effect around −4% after two-three years for younger/no-dividend firms. The degree
of heterogeneity in Figure 10 appears more pronounced than in Figure 9, especially for the U.K,
although the differences do not seem significant.47
In summary, for all age/dividend groups of companies, equity at market value and share prices
decline persistently and sizably in response to an unanticipated interest rate increase.
46Similar results are obtained using the log of assets at market values, whose interpretation, however, is confounded
by the fact that assets increase mechanically with an expansion in capital expenditure, as estimated in Section 5.
47The estimates of the dynamic effects of monetary policy on firm-level share prices are consistent with the aggregate
response estimated using data use an aggregate stock market index.
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6.4 Cash flows
Another channel through which financial frictions may amplify the effects of monetary policy on
investment is the response of cash flows (a term we use in an economic sense rather than in strictly
accounting sense). For instance, a fall in earnings following an interest rate increase could further
accelerate the decline in capital expenditure if a significant fraction of firm debt is secured against
earnings. While we have already shown in Section 6.2 that the debt of younger non-dividend payers
is secured mostly against assets, a decline in cash flows could also trigger a shortage of internal funds,
which may result in a further contraction of investment for firms struggling to attract external funds.
This earning-based amplification hypothesis is explored in Figures 11 and 12. Figures 11 reports
the results for sales growth and Figure 12 reports the results for the growth of EBITDA (essentially
sales net of costs). Again, we show the response of cash flows by age and dividend status. We
maintain the usual 2x2 format. The responses of cash flows are not particularly sizable (especially in
comparison to the response of net worth in Section 6.3) and are also relatively homogeneous across
the four age/dividends groups. This is true in both countries using sales or EBITDA, although
there is a slightly more pronounced effect on EBITDA for younger non-dividend payers in the U.K..
Together with the evidence in Section 6.2, we interpret the relatively smaller and more uniform
estimates for earnings across groups as evidence that a cash flow channel, on its own, seems unlikely
to play a quantitatively major role in accounting for the heterogeneity in the response of capital
expenditure that we document in Figure 4. That said, although an earnings-based channel may be
less important than an asset-based channel for younger firms, both channels imply that financial
frictions amplify the dynamic effects of monetary policy.48
48Figure 11 also shows that sales exhibit an even more homogeneous response to monetary policy shocks across
demographic/dividend status groups. This also suggests that heterogeneity in demand is unlike to be a main driver
of the heterogeneity in capital expenditure responses. Furthermore, we emphasize that even a significant demand
channel for all groups would still require the presence of some forms of financial frictions to rationalize the finding
that younger non-dividend payers adjust their capital expenditure far more following a monetary policy shock.
In this section, we have provided a detailed and comprehensive analysis of how monetary policy
influences different sources of firm finance. Corporate age appears an intuitive proxy for financial
constraints, but it is hard to interpret heterogeneity in the investment responses without also looking
at how a firm’s financing behaviour changes with monetary policy.
Our findings are: (i) only the borrowing of younger firms paying no dividends declines when
interest rates increase, despite interest payments increasing for all groups (Section 6.1); (ii) younger
non-dividend payers are far more exposed to fluctuations in asset values (Section 6.2); (iii) net worth
falls considerably for all companies (Section 6.3); (iv) the drop in cash flows is smaller and more
6.5 Summary
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homogeneous across firms (Section 6.4). In the previous section, we have shown that investment
declines far more for younger non-dividend payers.
All these findings are consistent with theoretical frameworks in which the firm’s ability to borrow
is related to the value of their assets. That said, we do not find much heterogeneity by leverage
after conditioning on age. Consequently, although our evidence appears consistent with a balance
sheet channel of monetary policy, many of the models featuring an amplification mechanism based
on asset values (such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999)) do not consider
age. On the other hand, financial friction models that do consider age (such as Cooley and Quadrini
(2001)) typically abstract from an explicit role for asset values.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have combined high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks with panel econo-
metric techniques for micro data to explore how, and why, different firms respond to changes in
interest rates. Our main contribution is to provide a systematic evaluation of the balance sheet
channel of monetary policy for firms. On the one hand, we have investigated which group of firms
change their investment the most. On the other hand, we have documented how different forms
of corporate finance respond. Our goal is to analyse jointly these two sets of new findings to shed
light on the relevance of financial constraints and firm finance in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy to investment. Our approach also allows us to quantify the aggregate importance
of the firms most likely facing financial constraints.
Across all the dimensions considered, firm age is the strongest predictor of having a significantly
higher sensitivity to monetary policy, with the response of capital expenditure being particularly
pronounced among younger non-dividend payers. This pervasive heterogeneity by age is robust to
controlling for other firm characteristics including size, growth, Tobin’s Q, leverage and liquidity.
Our evidence on the heterogeneous response of investment and different forms of corporate
finance is also informative about the underlying transmission channels. Following a monetary
policy tightening, we find that borrowing declines significantly only for younger non-dividend payers,
against the backdrop of a sizable fall in net worth and a rise in interest payments for all groups of
firms. Younger firms paying no dividends are more exposed to asset price fluctuations because their
borrowing is highly correlated with asset values but not with earnings, both in absolute terms and
relative to the debt sensitivity of the other groups. In contrast, the response of cash flows is less
pronounced and more homogeneous.
One interpretation of all our new firm-level findings is that the capital expenditure of younger
non-dividend payers is constrained by their asset values and/or net worth. As monetary policy
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changes affect asset prices, this magnifies the investment response. Older companies, in contrast,
rely on a more diverse set of funding sources and their investment decisions are, therefore, less
vulnerable to fluctuations in asset prices. Younger firms paying no dividends account for over 75%
of the response of aggregate investment. As a result, our findings suggest that this balance sheet
channel plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy to firms.
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Figure 1a: Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics by age
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Notes: Each panel reports the predicted values based on age and its squares from a regression of the variable of
interest on age and age squared conditional on sector-time fixed effects and firms’ controls as detailed in Section 3.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. 36
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Figure 1b: Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics by age cont’ed
Notes: Each panel reports the predicted values based on age and its squares from a regression of the variable of
interest on age and age squared conditional on sectors-time fixed effects and firms’ controls as detailed in Section 3.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and time.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1911
Figure 2: Average Effect of Monetary Policy on Investment
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The IRFs
are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators for younger (< 15 years since incorporation), middle-aged (15− 50 years
since incorporation) and older firms (> 50 years since incorporation). The IRFs are estimated using the local
projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the
Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age and Dividends Paid
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age and dividend status. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means the
firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 5: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Size/Growth
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based
on age, dividend status, size and asset growth. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends
means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Smaller firms refer to those in the bottom quartile of the size distribution in the previous year.
Faster-growing firms are those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described
in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 6: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Leverage/Liquidity
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UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, size and asset growth. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No
dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Firms with lower leverage are those in the bottom quartile of the distribution in the
previous year. High liquidity are those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach
described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 7: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Borrowings by Age and Dividends Paid
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions for the response of real total debt growth following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on age and dividend status. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since
incorporation. No dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach
described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 8: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Interest Payments by Age and Dividends Paid
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions for the response of log interest expenditures following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on age and dividend status. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since
incorporation. No dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach
described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 9: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on the Market Value of Equity by Age and Dividends Paid
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions for the response of equity at market value (natural log of real common shares outstanding × the share
price) following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based on age and dividend status. Younger refers
to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous
year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the
Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 10: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Share Prices by Age and Dividends Paid
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions for the response of share prices (quarter average) following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The
interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based on age and dividend status. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years
since incorporation. No dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach
described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure 11: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Sales by Age and Dividends Paid
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UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions for the response of real sales growth (year on year growth) following a 25bps increase in the interest rates.
The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based on age and dividend status. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15
years since incorporation. No dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV
approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial
correlation.
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Figure 12: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Earnings by Age and Dividends Paid
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions for the response of real EBITDA (year on year growth) following a 25bps increase in the interest rates.
The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based on age and dividend status. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15
years since incorporation. No dividends means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV
approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial
correlation.
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Table 1: Group contributions to the average effect
United States
Younger Older
No Dividends Paid Dividends No Dividends Paid Dividends
Collateralt 0.0628** 0.0557** 0.0369** 0.0376**
(0.0131) (0.0210) (0.0099) (0.0141)
EBITDAt 0.0068 0.090* -0.0032 0.0484**
(0.0160) (0.0486) (0.0094) (0.0183)
EBITDAt−1 0.0076 -0.0370 0.0091* 0.0097
(0.0126) (0.0382) (0.0049) (0.0101)
R2 = 0.22
United Kingdom
Younger Older
No Dividends Paid Dividends No Dividends Paid Dividends
Collateralt
0.0245** 0.0301** 0.0203 0.0117
(0.0092) (0.0107) (0.0125) (0.0093)
EBITDAt
-0.0126 -0.0159 0.0160 0.0694**
(0.0114) (0.0273) (0.0218) (0.0191)
EBITDAt−1
-0.0084 0.0534** 0.0158 0.0312**
(0.0059) (0.0162) (0.0119) (0.0144)
R2 = 0.25
Notes: **, * denote significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Collateralt
and EBITDAt are measured at the beginning of the year. Firm and time-two-digit-sector fixed effects are included.
Additional firm-level controls are leverage, liquidity, cash flow from operations all measured at the beginning of the
year, and total assets and Tobin’s Q measured at the end of the year. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
months/quarters. All level variables are normalised by total assets at the beginning of the year, except EBITDAt−1,
which is normalised by assets at the beginning of t− 1.
Younger Older
No Dividends Paid Dividends No Dividends Paid Dividends
U.S. 75.5% 6.7% 13.0% 4.8%
[ 66.1 , 84.8 ] [ 1.8 , 11.6] [ 5.1 , 20.9 ] [ 1.7 , 7.6 ]
U.K. 83.6% 13.1% 2.9% 0.4%
[ 70.4 , 96.8 ] [ 2.9 , 23.2 ] [ -2.2 , 8.1 ] [ -5.9 , 6.9]
Notes: the first row in each country represents the weighted share of the average IRF explained by the corresponding
group; see main text for a detailed description. 95% CI in square brackets, computed from 500 bootstrap repetitions
accounting for firm clustering.
Table 2: The correlation of long term debt with collateral values and cash-flows
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ON-LINE APPENDICES
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49WorldScope provides some variables at the ‘interim’ quarterly frequency within a fiscal year, as well as information
for some private firms. However, such information is scarce, so we restrict to publicly traded firms annual reports.
50Employment is scarcely populated in our data, although among the companies for which we observe both variables,
the correlation between number of employees and assets value is high.
51We calculate the market value as the sum of the market value of its outstanding stock at the end of the accounting
year (market capitalization) plus the value of its outstanding debt. This is an upper bound on Tobins Q, as deferred
taxes have many missing values in the dataset. The results are unchanged when including this variable in the
calculation for those firms that provide information.
52In the U.K., we subtract cost of goods sold from this measure.
A Data description and variable definitions
A.1 Sources, definitions and sample selection
Sources. Detailed financial statement data for publicly listed companies are available from Com-
pustat (available from WRDS) for the United States and from Thomson Reuters’ WorldScope for
the United Kingdom. Firms report at a quarterly frequency in the U.S. and for each fiscal year
in the U.K..49 In WorldScope, British firms report in different months throughout the year but
each firm tends to report always in the same month across the years. Consistent information for
a sufficiently large number of firms in both dataset only begins in 1986, when our sample starts.
In keeping with the rest of the empirical literature, we exclude firms in the finance, insurance, real
estate or public administration sectors.
Information on bond issuance comes from Dealscan, which we merge with the Worldscope dataset
in the U.K. and Compustat in the US. For the U.K., the Bureau van Dijk database contains
information on credit scores. For the U.S. WRDS contains the S&P credit rating database which
comprises rating for (the relatively small number of ) firms that issue bonds. We merge this into
Compustat.
For the macro data, we use data from the Bureau of Labour Statistics and the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (FRED) for the United States, and from the Office for National Statistics and
the Bank of England for the United Kingdom, respectively. For the corporate spread in the United
States, we use data from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). For the average mortgage rate and the
corporate spread in the United Kingdom, we use the collated data from (Gerko and Rey, 2017).
The financial market surprises come from (Gerko and Rey, 2017) and we thank Peter Karadi for
sharing the updated version of the financial market surprises from Gertler and Karadi (2015)
Construction of firm-level variables. We provide definitions of variables used in the analysis
(other than the investment ratio and corporate age, which were described in section 3) in table A.1
below.
Size is measured as the book value of assets.50 The average Tobin’s Q is defined as total assets at
market value over total assets at book value.51 Liquidity is the ratio between cash plus short-term
investments and total assets; cash flows are constructed as cash flow from operations, while sales
are defined as gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances.52 The
construction of firm age is discussed in the text. In short, we use Worldscope information on the
incorporation date. For the U.S., we merge Worldscope with Compustat. Where the incorporation
date is missing we use BEGDAT from CRSP, which records the date when a firm’s stocks started
trading. These variables are well populated, unlike the native IPO date variable in Compustat.
Leverage is the ratio of total debt at time t to total assets, where total debt includes both short
and long term obligations. Total debt is the sum of short term and long term debt, observed directly
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as total debt in the U.K. We use the change in total debt and long term debt, respectively, to measure
net borrowing in both countries to maximise data coverage. Interest payments are measured by
the income state variable total interest expenses, which is defined as the interest accrued on total
debt. We follow (Lian and Ma, 2018) and measure collateral as the sum of net plant, property
and equipment, inventories, and net accounts receivable. Dividends are cash dividends paid. Share
prices are quarter averages. We use market capitalisation to measure the value of equity, the number
of common stock outstanding multiplied by the share price.
All variables are converted to real values using the aggregate GVA deflator in the United States
and the United Kingdom.
Although Compustat is quarterly and data have been assigned (at source) to calendar quarters,
some variables are cumulative within the fiscal year. We therefore difference these variables within
the fiscal year to create the quarterly series. There are a small numbers of missing observations in
Compustat and we follow others in the literature and interpolate missing values.
Aggregation of firm-level investment. The series of investment by publicly traded firms pre-
sented in figure A.1 are constructed by aggregating investment recorded by each firm during a
fiscal period to a calendar frequency (quarters). In Compustat, capital expenditure is recorded at
quarterly frequency, so the time series can be constructed directly using reported data. We simply
add up capital expenditure by quarter and convert this into a real series using the GVA deflator.
In the United Kingdom, investment is reported at annual frequency and for each firm’s respective
fiscal year. We proceed as follows: (i) for each firm, we assign capital expenditures of the fiscal
year in each proportions to each of the previous twelve months; (ii) we aggregate investment at the
Variable Definition Compustat (U.S.) Definition WorldScope (U.K.)
Investment ratio capxq/L.ppentq 04601, 02501
Size atq 02999
Age Incorpdat (WS), Begdat (CPRS) 18273
Tobin’s Q (atq + prccq×cshoq - ceqq + txditcq) / atq (08001 + 02999 - 04101 - 03501)/02999
Cash-flows (oancf+xint) / at 04860 / 02999
Sales saleq 01001
EBITDA (sale - cogs - xsga) 18198
Leverage (dlcq + dlttq) /atq 03255/02999
Total debt dlcq + dlttq 03255
Interest payments xintq 01251
Collateral (ppent + invt + rect) 02501 + 02101 + 02051
Dividends paid dvq 04551
Share price (prchq+prclq)/2 05002, 05003
Equity (mkt. value) prccq × cshoq 08001
monthly frequency across firms.
Baseline sample restrictions. The sample period is 1986-2016. We further impose a set of
sample restrictions: (i) we drop firms within the finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE) and public
administration sectors; (ii) we drop observations for which age is negative; (iii) we drop firms which
are in the panel for less than 6 years in the UK and 20 quarters in the US (iv) we trim the investment
Table A.1: Variable description
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53This accounts for the different sample sizes and potential composition effects in the two countries. The results in
the U.S. are robust to trimming 4%, but we choose to maximise the number of observations over identical trimming
strategies in both countries. Capex does not have any negative observations in the U.K. after cleaning the sample
from short-lived firms and FIRE sectors.
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Figure A.1: Investment over time: aggregated micro data VS. national statistics
ratio (1% top and bottom in the U.S., top 4% in the U.K.);53 (v) we drop observations if the liquidity
ratio is larger than 1; (vi) we trim the top 1% of the leverage ratio; (vii) we trim the top and bottom
1% of real sales growth. Trimming of variables is done separately for each calendar year, except for
absolute thresholds such as for the liquidity ratio.
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B High-frequency surprises and monetary policy shocks
Figure B.1: Time series of monetary policy surprises and shocks
United States United Kingdom
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Notes: The top panel shows the raw financial market surprises (Gerko and Rey (2017) and updated Gertler and
Karadi (2015)). The bottom panel show the implies monetary policy shocks from the proxy-VAR in these papers. We
deviate from these papers in re-estimating the sample period to match that of our micro-data: 1986-2016.
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C Evidence based on aggregate time series
Figure C.1: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on selected national statistics data
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Notes: impulse response function to a 25bps increase in the interest rates using local projection IV (top row, investment
is quarterly) or the proxy-VAR directly (other rows, where the data and the VAR is monthly). Because of data
availability, the model in the top (other) row(s) is estimated at quarterly (monthly) frequency.
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D U.S. results reported at yearly frequency
Figure D.1: U.S. average effect reported at quarterly and yearly frequency
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The IRFs
are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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E Grouping by other firms’ characteristics
In this Appendix, we present results by splitting the sample according to alternative groupings. More
specifically, we explore heterogeneity in the capital expenditure responses by looking in isolation
(as opposed to double sorting of the sample) at size, growth, leverage, Tobin’s Q and dividends.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on quartiles of the size distribution. The IRFs are estimated using the
local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the
Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
E.1 Capital expenditure responses by firm size only
Figure E.1: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Size
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E.2 Capital expenditure responses by leverage only
Figure E.2: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Leverage
United States United Kingdom
L
o
w
le
v
e
ra
g
e
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Pe
rc
en
t
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
Quarters
-4
-2
-1
0
2
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Year end (Q4)
M
e
d
iu
m
le
v
e
ra
g
e
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Pe
rc
en
t
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
Quarters
-4
-2
-1
0
2
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Year end (Q4)
H
ig
h
le
v
e
ra
g
e
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Pe
rc
en
t
1 4 7 10 13 16 19
Quarters
-4
-2
-1
0
2
Pe
rc
en
t
1 2 3 4 5
Year end (Q4)
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on quartiles of the leverage distribution. The IRFs are estimated using
the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US
the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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E.3 Capital expenditure responses by liquidity only
Figure E.3: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Liquidity
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on quartiles of the liquidity ratio distribution. The IRFs are estimated
using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the
US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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E.4 Capital expenditure responses by assets growth only
Figure E.4: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Firms’ Growth
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on quartiles of the asset growth rate distribution. The IRFs are
estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicators based on quartiles of the Tobin’s Q distribution. The IRFs are estimated
using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the
US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
E.5 Capital expenditure responses by Tobin’s Q only
Figure E.5: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Tobin’s Q
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E.6 Capital expenditure responses by paying dividends status only
Figure E.6: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Paying Dividends
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with binary indicator for whether dividends were paid in the previous year. The IRFs are estimated
using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the
US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest
rate is interacted with a binary indicator for whether bonds have been issued in the past. The IRFs are estimated
using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the
US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
E.7 Capital expenditure responses by issuer status only
Figure E.7: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Issuer Status
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F Controlling for other firms’ characteristics
SMALLER LARGER
Figure F.1: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Size for the United States
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, size. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means the
firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Smaller firms refer to those in the bottom quartile of the size distribution in the previous year. The IRFs are
estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment
is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure F.2: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Size for the United Kingdom
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, size. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means the
firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Smaller firms refer to those in the bottom quartile of the size distribution in the previous year. The IRFs are
estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay adjustment
is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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FASTER-GROWING SLOWER-GROWING
Figure F.3: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Asset Growth for the U.S.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, asset growth. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends
means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Faster growing firms refer to those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The
IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay
adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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FASTER-GROWING SLOWER-GROWING
Figure F.4: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Asset Growth for the U.K.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, asset growth. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends
means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Faster growing firms refer to those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The
IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay
adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure F.5: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Leverage for the U.S.
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, leverage. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means
the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Lower leverage firms refer to those in the bottom quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The
IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay
adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure F.6: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Leverage for the U.K.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, leverage. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means
the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Lower leverage firms refer to those in the bottom quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The
IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay
adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure F.7: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Tobin’s Q for the U.S.
Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based
on age, dividend status, Tobin’s Q. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means the
firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Higher Tobin’s Q refers firms refer to those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The
IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay
adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure F.8: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Tobin’s Q for the U.K.
LOWER TOBIN’S Q HIGHER TOBIN’S Q
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators based
on age, dividend status, Tobin’s Q. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends means the
firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Higher Tobin’s Q refers firms refer to those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous year. The
IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the Driscoll-Kraay
adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Figure F.9: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Liquidity for the U.S.
LOWER LIQUIDITY HIGHER LIQUIDITY
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, the liquidity ratio. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends
means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Higher liquidity refers firms refer to those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous
year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the
Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
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Notes: This figure shows the impulse response functions following a 25bps increase in the interest rates. The interest rate is interacted with binary indicators
based on age, dividend status, the liquidity ratio. Younger refers to < 15 years since incorporation and older refers to > 15 years since incorporation. No dividends
means the firm did not pay cash dividends in the previous year. Higher liquidity refers firms refer to those in the top quartile of the distribution in the previous
year. The IRFs are estimated using the local projection IV approach described in the text. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time. For the US the
Driscoll-Kraay adjustment is used to correct for potential serial correlation.
Figure F.10: Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy on Investment by Age, Dividends Paid and Liquidity for the U.K.
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